Non-Traditional Security, Securitization, and Human Rights in East Asia: Considerations for a Human Security Agenda

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I. INTRODUCTION

Although the idea of non-traditional security (NTS) or human security, as it is often called, has already been presented as an emerging concept as early as 1994 in the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report,[1] it was only recently that the concept has gained

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considerable attention in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and East Asian regions. NTS has emerged in response to the glaring fact that while most countries today are heavily focused on militarization and state security, which are necessarily related to warfare and terrorist threats, other concerns, such as disease, environmental disasters, climate change, and socio-economic stress have also been endangering the lives and welfare of people.[2]

Traditionally, security has been understood "in geo-political terms and confined to relationships among nation-states, dealing with issues such as deterrence, the balance of power[,] and military strategy."[3] However, the advent of globalization has led thinkers to question the position that security is a mainly military concept, and has, for them, extended the equation by considering the roles of economic, political, and societal forces in defining security.[4] Likewise, the recent circumstances brought about by earthquakes and other natural calamities, as well as the continuing situation of poverty and oppression, have sent a signal to many sectors that the traditional notion of security needs to be expanded, and consequently, new programs and processes for ensuring security have to be developed.[5]

This is not to say, however, that this broader and more encompassing concept of human security has been fully accepted by everyone. In the Philippines, for instance, the Human Security Act of 2007,[6] is actually an anti-terrorism law. It has nothing to do with threats emanating from disease, calamities, or lack of food.[7] In the country's legal and political consciousness, human security is still understood in its traditional, military-oriented sense. This is indicative of how the concept of NTS, at least in the Philippines, and possibly in the rest of the ASEAN, is a nascent idea, which, while pushing a

1. Melissa G. Curley, The Role of NGOs in Non-Traditional Security in Northeast Asia (A Draft for the China-ASEAN Project, Center of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong) 5, *available at* http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/curley.html (last accessed Sep. 6, 2012).

2. *Id.*

3. Yizhou Wang, Defining Non-Traditional Security and its Implications for China (A Paper for the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), *available at* http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/ jspui/bitstream/123456789/21918/1/Defining%20Non%20Traditional%20Security%20and%20Its%20Implications%20for%20China.pdf? 1 (last accessed Sep. 6, 2012).

4. Saurabh Chaudhuri, Defining Non-Traditional Security Threat, *available at* http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontradionalsecurity.htm (last accessed Sep. 6, 2012).

5. *Id.*

6. An Act to Secure the State and Protect Our People from Terrorism [Human Security Act of 2007], Republic Act No. 9372 (2007).

7. *Id.* § 2.

hundred different ideas into the minds of academics and policy-makers alike, is still not understood in a sense that is distinct from traditional human security.

While the concept of NTS may have been widely used in political studies and practice throughout the years, the concept still lacks an acceptable and authoritative definition.[8] Professor Mely Caballero-Anthony, Secretary-General of the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia,[9] gives an enlightening approximation when she defined it as involving —

> challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, smuggling of persons, drug trafficking[,] and other forms of national crime.[10]

Such definition, however, fails to draw a line as to what issues should be included and what should be excluded.

Amitav Acharya identifies seven components of human security, which resonates with the concerns commonly associated with NTS, namely:

> (a) Economic security (assured basic income)[;]
>
> (b) Food security (physical and economic access to food)[;]
>
> (c) Health security (relative freedom from disease and infection)[;]
>
> (d) Environmental security (access to sanitary water supply, clean air[,] and a nondegraded land system)[;]
>
> (e) Personal security (security from physical violence and threats)[;]
>
> (f) Community security (security of cultural identity)[; and]
>
> (g) Political security (protection of basic human rights and freedoms).[11]

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8. Chaudhuri, *supra* note 4.

9. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Staff Profiles, *available at* http://www.rsis.edu.sg/ about_rsis/ staff_profiles/ Mely_Anthony.html (last accessed Sep. 6, 2012).

10. Mely Caballero-Anthony, Non-Traditional Security Challenges, Regional Governance and the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) (A Working Paper for the Asia Security Initiative Policy Series) 1, *available at* http://www.rsis.edu.sg/NTS/resources/research_papers/MacArthur_working_paper_Mely_Caballero-Anthony.pdf (last accessed Sep. 6, 2012).

11. What is "Human Security"?, *available at* http://www.globalcentres.org/cgcp/english/html_documents/publications/changes/issue5/index1.htm (last accessed Sep. 16, 2012). *See* AMITAV ACHARYA, UNESCO, PROMOTING HUMAN SECURITY: ETHICAL, NORMATIVE, AND EDUCATIONAL FRAMEWORKS IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 15 (2007).

Acharya notes, however, that the debate continues as to what human security means (or includes).[12] Curiously, she also points out that the focus on human security as a concept in Asia and Southeast Asia leans more on freedom from want rather than freedom from fear, despite the fact that Southeast Asia has witnessed some of the worst violence of the 20th Century.[13]

This seems to signal that while the understanding of security in the region, at least linguistically, is still heavily associated with military concerns, there is however great recognition for the needs which are associated with the emerging concept of non-traditional human security. The challenge then seems to be not only articulating a definition of NTS but also developing it into a framework which may be integrated into the existing policy systems established in national governments across the region.

II. THE CHALLENGE OF ESTABLISHING THE PARAMETERS OF NON-TRADITIONAL HUMAN SECURITY AND SETTING AN AGENDA FOR GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

The more traditional providers of protection, namely governments, seem to be the more reluctant to accept the non-traditional concept of human security. Acharya points out that there are two main reasons for the lack of interest and enthusiasm in developing a human security agenda.

First, while governments recognize the concerns of non-traditional human security as legitimate, they often feel that those concerns are already answered by their current security framework.[14] Many governments feel they already have a comprehensive notion of security.[15] Problems with this way of thinking arise when one examines exactly what that comprehensive notion of security is. Given the events of 11 September 2001 and the surge of anti-terrorist sentiments spearheaded by the United States (U.S.), governments all around the world have focused their efforts and resources into improving military security.[16] While the destruction of the twin towers was an event that is widely accepted as being sourced from tensions between the U.S. and the Middle East, countries in Asia have not been immunized to the trend of security that was to be its result. This can be seen in the "increased militarization of the [ASEAN] region, as measured in terms of the

12. *Id.*

13. *Id.* at 15-16.

14. *Id.* at 12.

15. *Id.*

16. Agence France-Presse, U.S. military spending up 81 percent since 2001: report, Apr. 11, 2011, *available at* http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2011/04/11/global-military-spending-growth-slowest-since-2001/ (last accessed Sep. 6, 2012).

ratio of security forces to the overall population."[17] While an increased security ratio is not unhealthy or dangerous in itself, it does have implications, or rather, consequences for other aspects of human security.

In 2003, at a Strategy for Peace Conference held by the Stanley Foundation for Southeast Asia, many participants agreed that "the [U.S.'] emphatic focus on terrorism [and consequently the response from other countries] was neglecting critical dimensions of the human security agenda."[18] On the one hand, participants pointed out that addressing what are often termed as the areas of NTS would actually prevent terrorist attacks in the long run because it addresses the source of motivation for terrorism.[19] On the other hand, securitization schemes which focus heavily on prevention and suppression, while not recognizing the links terrorist activities necessarily have to other areas of human security, do not do much to ameliorate the situation and might even be aggravating it.[20] Such securitization measures are not really comprehensive, and the dominant thinking that they are, is part of the reason why human security needs to be put forward as a serious program for governments.

Second, the other reason which Acharya notes as the cause of lack of enthusiasm for NTS, and this is specifically significant for both ASEAN countries and other East Asian countries, is that many governments are suspicious that the notion of NTS is representative of a Western agenda.[21] It is seen as focusing too much on "liberal values" and ignoring the specific economic and developmental goals particular to the region.[22] There is suspicion that any push for human security is actually geared towards making the economic and policy-making environment of Asian countries more favorable to the West, and that "creating mechanisms and institutions to promote human security might require states to relinquish their sovereignty[.]"[23] This suspicion is bolstered by the fact that, more often than not, Western conceptualizations of human security are perceived to be highly interventionist,[24] much in the same way that human rights and

17. *Id.* at 18.

18. The Stanley Foundation, Nontraditional Security Threats in Asia (A Policy Bulletin written for the 44th Strategy Peace Conference) 2, *available at* http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/archive/SPC03Cpb.pdf (last accessed Sep. 16, 2012).

19. *Id.*

20. *Id.* at 1-2.

21. ACHARYA, *supra* note 11, at 12.

22. *Id.*

23. *Id.* at 21.

24. *Id.*

humanitarian law have been advanced.[25] Correspondingly, this fear highlights the need for the ASEAN and the East Asian region to form their own definitions and create their own discourse on what constitutes human security.

Believing that the parameters of the definition of NTS should be the focus of academic research, Chinese scholar Yizhou Wang opines —

> In essence, 'security' as a special term always has its extraordinary implications. Once termed as a security issue, anything would have a special 'political' meaning, and government interference becomes possible (or necessary). It would then have to be at the top of the agenda for decision-makers[ ] and become the focal point for the general public and the mass media. As creators of words and everyday use and guides of public perception, researchers of security issue must be very prudent and careful in defining what can be included as 'security' issue, looking for rules and correlations. For theoretical researchers, the most important thing is not to focus on specific phenomena, but to identify their common characteristics, hence offering a relatively clear direction for the study of specific cases.[26]

III. THE CHALLENGE IN ADOPTING AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTING MECHANISM FOR A HUMAN SECURITY AGENDA

That NTS issues have actually posed serious challenges to the East Asian region has emphasized the need for a regional strategy and mechanism in order to effectively respond to these threats and ease the impact of their debilitating consequences. It has been written that NTS "is broad in threat sources, transnational in effect, and sudden when it breaks out"[27] and that the way to combat these threats is by fostering international cooperation through nation states.[28] However, regional cooperation has been espoused as a preferred strategy in dealing with NTS issues, as compared to more global efforts, because the latter has been perceived as slower and less efficient due to the difference in interests involved.[29] Accordingly, unlike global efforts, a regional one "could more efficiently address the security issues affecting common interest, and [make it] easier to coordinate with each other. In today's world, regional cooperation is a realistic choice."[30]

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25. *Id.*

26. Wang, *supra* note 3.

27. Wang Yong, East Asia Community and Non-Traditional Security: A Proposal from China, *available at* http://www.irchina.org/en/news/view.asp?id=404 (last accessed Sep. 6, 2012).

28. *Id.*

29. *Id.*

30. *Id.*

Regional cooperation has already been forged, particularly in the sub-region of Southeast Asia. As noted by Caballero-Anthony —

> [S]ince the Asian [F]inancial [C]risis of 1997-98, ASEAN has undertaken a number of institutional 'innovations' to better respond to a host of regional challenges. The latest is the 2003 Bali Concord II that announced the establishment of an ASEAN Community based on three pillars: the ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. ... Similarly, the [ASEAN Plus Three (APT)] had formalized the framework for forging closer economic linkages between ASEAN and its three East Asian neighbors — China, Japan, and South Korea. This can be seen in its development of a regional financial mechanism — the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), which is a liquidity support facility designed to prevent another financial crisis and includes initiatives to develop a regional bond market.[31]

Taking the example of APT initiating coordinated efforts to monitor the spread of infectious diseases, Caballero-Anthony further observes that compared to the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASIA-Pacific Economic Cooperation, sub-regional responses have been more timely and, thus, effective because the sub-regional bodies are more institutionalized.[32] Nevertheless, Caballero-Anthony also underscores the importance of a more inclusive "regionalism" in cases of "grave security threats like pandemics, terrorism, natural disasters, [etc.]."[33] Additionally, unlike those who are more skeptical about establishing a mechanism that is beyond regional in scope, she acknowledges the importance of involving the extra-regional powers like the U.S. and the European Union which can commit their resources and "whose security interests are compatible with the region."[34]

Still, challenges remain as to the direction and development of these new modalities of cooperation in the region. One of these challenges is the fact that these modalities might entail more intrusive cooperative arrangements given that the threats addressed often affect the entire region.[35] In this respect, Caballero-Anthony comments —

> [M]any of the regional measures adopted are now geared toward problem-solving, involving sharing of information; developing certain types of regional surveillance systems for early warning on infectious diseases and

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31. Mely Caballero-Anthony, The Stanley Foundation, Nontraditional Security and Multilateralism in Asia: Reshaping the Contours of Regional Security Architecture? (A Policy Analysis Brief) 3, *available at* http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/ pab/pab07mely.pdf (last accessed Sep. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Caballero-Anthony, The Stanley Foundation].

32. *Id.* at 8.

33. *Id.* at 9.

34. *Id.*

35. *Id.*

natural disasters; providing relief in disaster management, rehabilitation, and reconstruction; and, more significantly, working toward coordinated procedures and attempts at harmonizing legal frameworks in addressing transnational crimes.[36]

Another challenge for countries in the region is the possibility of having competing national priorities in the process of working against certain NTS issues.[37] Hence, this challenge seems to be in forging a strong sense of regional or sub-regional community, upon which the implementation of existing frameworks for cooperation depends.[38] Already, there are some who doubt the effectiveness of the community considering that the countries involved have their own problems to focus on which, to them, should take priority over all other issues. There is also the afore-stated preference for non-interference from other states, regional threat notwithstanding. These factors weaken the community and the enforceability of its regional arrangements.[39]

In the recently signed Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations,[40] the 10 heads[41] of the ASEAN States adopted "[a]n ASEAN common platform on global issues"[42] which included:

36. *Id.* at 8.

37. Caballero-Anthony, The Stanley Foundation, *supra* note 31, at 10.

38. *See* Caballero-Anthony, The Stanley Foundation, *supra* note 31, at 10.

39. Takeshi Kohno, Non-Traditional Issues in Southeast Asia in Limited Public Participation (A Powerpoint Presentation Delivered in the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies) 10, *available at* http://www.waseda-giari.jp/sysimg/imgs/20090228 _3-2_kohno.pdf (last accessed Sep. 16, 2012) & Eddie Walsh, Non-Traditional Security Threats in Asia: Finding a Regional Way Forward, *available at* http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/06/04/non-traditional-security-threats-in-asia-finding-a-regional-way-forward/ (last accessed Sep. 6, 2012).

40. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations, *available at* http://www.asean sec.org/documents/19th%20summit/Bali%20Concord%20III.pdf (last accessed Sep. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Bali Concord III].

41. Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Member States, *available at* http://www.aseansec.org/18619.htm (last accessed Sep. 6, 2012). The Heads of State of the ASEAN members are: Sultan Hali Hassanal Bolkiah (Brunei Darussalam); Prime Minister Samdech Hun Sen (Kingdom of Cambodia); President Susilo Yudhoyono (Republic of Indonesia); Prime Minister Thongsing Thammavong (Lao People's Democratic Republic); Prime Minister Najib Razak (Malaysia); President U Thein Sein (Republic of the Union of Myanmar); President Benigno Aquino III (Republic of the Philippines); Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong (Republic of Singapore); Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawarta (Kingdom of Thailand); & Nguyen Tan Dung (Socialist Republic of Viet Nam). *Id.*

(1) All forms of threats, transnational crimes, and transboundary challenges;[43]

(2) Corruption;[44]

(3) Food and energy security at the regional and global levels;[45]

(4) Disaster Management;[46]

(5) Sustainable Development, Environment, and Climate Change;[47] and

(6) Health.[48]

It should be noted, however, that the same Document also emphasizes that the ASEAN Member-States shall "[r]espect the principles of the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, and national identity of all nations"[49] and, in the same way that the Asian values was articulated in the Bangkok Declaration in 1993,[50] said Member-States also committed to "[p]romote the culture of peace, which includes, *inter alia*, respect for diversity, promotion of tolerance, and understanding of faiths, religions, and cultures, in accordance with applicable domestic laws."[51]

IV. "GLOCALITY" AS A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

Considering the prevalence of NTS threats despite efforts towards regional cooperation, the question posed by Professor Takeshi Kohno is worth

42. Bali Concord III, *supra* note 40, at 3.

43. *Id.* at 5.

44. *Id.* at 6.

45. *Id.* at 8.

46. *Id.* at 9.

47. *Id.* at 10.

48. Bali Concord III, *supra* note 40, at 11.

49. *Id.* at 4.

50. World Conference on Human Rights, Mar. 29-Apr. 2, 1993, *Final Declaration of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights*, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/59 (Apr. 7, 1993). This Paragraph points to a —

> [r]ecognition that while human rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds[.]

Id.

51. Bali Concord III, *supra* note 40, at 4.

pondering: "How effective is it to have a 'community' when each country is having problems of its own?"[52]

Is regional cooperation among East Asian states a hasty resolution premised on the assumption that diversity will not be much of a hindrance in the attainment of East Asia's consolidation? Indeed, the increased interconnectedness brought about by globalization has made people see and experience the world as a single place. However, what must be realized is that "the global and the local '*interpenetrate*' rather than maintain a distinct free-standing character."[53]

Another author also related the issue to globalization in this wise —

> [T]he growing *extensity*, *intensity*, and *velocity* of global interactions is associated with a deepening enmeshment of the local and the global in so far as local events may come to have global and regional consequences, creating a growing collective awareness or consciousness of the world as a shared social space[.][54]

It is in this light that it seems reasonable that *glocality*, which means "combining global and local elements within human activities,"[55] can provide "an interesting and coherent analytical framework that draws attention to 'fusions' between global and local processes and players[.]"[56] Recognition of the interplay between global and local elements may lead to a better understanding and more efficient manner of addressing the issues.

Acharya points out that what is really needed in addressing the cause of *human security*, given these problems is a localization of the idea of human security with already existing security concepts and approaches in the region.[57] In other words, what is recommended is making the concept of human security more familiar to and integrated with the already existing

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52. Kohno, *supra* note 39.

53. Donald Hugh McMillen, A Brief Introduction on Traditional and Non-Traditional Security: The "Glocal" Dimensions of Uncertainty in the Early 21st Century — Some Themes and a Proposed Analytical Framework (Introductory Paper for the 1st Annual Dialogue Forum of the Sino-Australian Joint Research Program) 2, *available at* http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/169252/donald-mcmillen-introduction-paper.pdf (last accessed Sep. 6, 2012) (citing ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALISATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE 64 (1992)).

54. Anthony McGrew, *Globalization and global politics*, *in* THE GLOBALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 18 (John Baylis, et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010).

55. McMillen, *supra* note 53, at 2 (citing ROBERT J. HOLTON, GLOBALIZATION AND THE NATION-STATE 22 (1998)) (emphasis omitted).

56. McMillen, *supra* note 53, at 5.

57. ACHARYA, *supra* note 11, at 26.

context of securitization efforts of ASEAN and other East Asian governments. This is a particular role which the academe may be best suited to fill, because of their familiarity with local contexts and also the wider concept of human security in general.

In her piece on Human Security and the Copenhagen approach, Rita Floyd names seven spheres which human security is concerned with. These are the economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political securities which every individual has a right to enjoy.[58]

Floyd notes that because of the multiplicity of these spheres, human security is *interdisciplinary in nature*, and the key is to define what constitutes security in these various spheres for the particular countries being talked about and to examine how notions of security are formed by each country or culture's social and symbolic processes.[59] This ties in well with Acharya's earlier observation that the large problems facing a possible human security agenda in the ASEAN and East Asian region relate to a lack of appreciation for the different understanding of security it advocates, and a lack of trust as to how this notion of security was formed and where it came from.[60]

V. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AS KEY ELEMENT

Because human security is interdisciplinary in nature,[61] it necessarily departs from the traditional statist focus of approaches such as that of the Copenhagen School, where the government is seen as the prime provider of security to the individuals and the collectivities to which they belong.[62] Because traditional notions of securitization focus on military, warfare, and diplomacy driven security, this connection to the government is logical.

Nevertheless, because alternative human security seeks to encompass a larger sphere, it also recognizes other sources of security apart from government.[63] This is not to say that governments do not provide for the health, economic, and other securities of their constituents. Certainly they do. However, non-traditional human security also acknowledges alternative sources which can be tapped and which the government should be able to work with in order to achieve optimal security for human persons in areas other than those often associated with military and diplomacy. In Caballero-

58. Rita Floyd, *Human Security and the Copenhagen School's Securitization Appraoch: Conceptualizing Human Security as a Securitizing Move*, 5 HUM. SEC. J. 38, 40 (2007).

59. *Id.*

60. ACHARYA, *supra* note 11, at 20-22.

61. Floyd, *supra* note 58, at 40.

62. *Id.*

63. *Id.*

Anthony's article on non-traditional society and multilateralism in the ASEAN, she additionally observes that because of the characteristics of NTS threats which are "neither domestic nor purely interstate, [which] come with very short notice, and [which] are transmitted rapidly due to globalization and communication revolution,"[64] strictly government-based solutions are often inadequate. She acknowledges that multiple layers of security sources have formed within and among states which do not always involve the government.[65] However, it is also observed that governments remain a crucial player in the area of human security, and it consequently needs to learn to integrate itself into these layers and work with the new entities constituting them, and vice versa.[66]

The lack of appreciation for the necessary involvement of civil society, may partially account for the failure to arrive at an effective enforcement mechanism. To address human security issues, it is required that "solutions be people-based, multilateral, and multisectoral [or] holistic"[67] because these issues are "location-specific, complex, and constantly changing."[68] As such, "these issues cannot be solved solely through government action."[69] Furthermore, governments have inherent deficiencies and limitations that hinder it from effectively addressing NTS issues.[70] For one, some governments refuse to enlarge the political involvement of citizens in order to resolve the development imbalance and income distribution inequality resulting to tensions between government and citizens.[71] Also, there exists an apparent contradiction between government's targets and NTS —

> In order to obtain rapid growth or shake off economic crises, some East Asian governments intended to suppress citizens' legal requirements, which eventually caused social and political turmoil. In order to attract foreign direct investment, governments deliberately keep workers' payment at low level and severely suppress the workers' organizational activities.[72]

64. Caballero-Anthony, The Stanley Foundation, *supra* note 31, at 1.

65. *Id.* at 1-2.

66. *Id.* at 10.

67. The Stanley Foundation, *supra* note 18, at 2.

68. *Id.* at 3.

69. *Id.*

70. Li Wen, The Role of Government and NGO in Managing Non-Traditional Security Issues in East Asia, *available at* http://yataisuo.cass.cn/english/articles/showcontent.asp?id=672 (last accessed Sep. 6, 2012).

71. *Id.*

72. *Id.*

Indeed, the government has become an oppressor and producer of insecurity to the victims of the adjustment policies.[73]

Lastly, the government does not have the necessary financial and human resources and the capacity to resolve NTS issues, while also having to devote said resources to other domestic problems such as population and social security.[74]

The above limitations notwithstanding, the dominant mechanisms existing today involve mostly state actors. Thus, despite the numerous policies and resolutions that have resulted from the existing regional mechanisms, issues have yet to be effectively addressed by these, as such measures do not exactly meet the people's needs.

It is therefore necessary to emphasize people-centered security.[75] A shift of focus and policy direction will increase the effectiveness of such policies by creating ones that better meet people's needs.[76] To do this, there must be collaboration between the government and civil society, focusing on the strengthening of the capacity of both and holding the former accountable for corruption and human rights violations.[77] This is because for securitization to work, "a securitizing actor needs capabilities [ ], because otherwise the securitization will amount to nothing more than a securitizing move"[78] — a mere expression of existential fear.[79]

In enlarging the participation of the civil society, the emerging role of non-government organizations (NGOs) and its potential contribution in addressing issues on NTS may be looked into.[80] NGOs, which work with, and/or emerge from grass roots, can bridge the gap between the interest of citizens and how the government receives such interests, and promote mutual understanding and communication of the same.[81] They can play a positive role in settling government-citizen contradiction and laying useful foundations for safeguarding social and political security.[82] NGOs can also

73. *Id.*

74. *Id.*

75. *See* The Stanley Foundation *supra* note 18, at 2 & Wen, *supra* note 70.

76. The Stanley Foundation, *supra* note 18, at 2.

77. *Id.* at 5.

78. Floyd, *supra* note 58, at 41.

79. *Id.*

80. Wen, *supra* note 70.

81. *Id.*

82. *Id.*

aid in finding "new channels for finance, information, and other sources outside of the government's framework."[83]

Caballero-Anthony notes that this milieu of traditional and non-traditional threats has given rise to an intricate institutionalism which alters the security arrangements in the region, going past the conventional government to government, or government to people relationships.[84] Her approach to human security invites one to examine the different institutions that have been created to answer to the different human security needs and how these interact with both the people themselves and the government and its own brand of human security. She invites the recognition of how the interdisciplinary nature of non-traditional human security has been translated into a corresponding plurality of institutional sources of security.

To have a working agenda for advancing NTS, there is a need for government to understand both the new institutions and relationships which become sources of security; and how to transform its current security framework, or at least integrate these new concepts into the existing securitization schemes in their countries. Another aspect, however, of building this human security framework is recognizing that one goal is to empower the people themselves.[85]

Both traditional and non-traditional securities have people as their reference points; that is, people at the receiving end of the security.[86] These people could be seen as individuals, but more often than not are addressed as collectivities, which is why institutions are often seen as the sources for security, whether traditional or not.[87] In traditional security which involves military and other war threats, individuals are seen as being in no position to legitimize their own claim to survival,[88] which is why governments are often seen as the major players.[89] However, since alternative human security recognizes threats other than military-related ones, it also recognizes a legitimate place for the individual to help assure and establish the various types of securities which it covers.[90] The institutions of the NTS brand function differently from government, in that the connections between them and the people are often more intimate and immediate. It is the people

83. *Id.*

84. Caballero-Anthony, The Stanley Foundation, *supra* note 31, at 2.

85. The Stanley Foundation, *supra* note 18, at 2.

86. Floyd, *supra* note 58, at 40.

87. *Id.*

88. *Id.*

89. *Id.*

90. Mely Caballero-Anthony, *Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia*, 28 ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 155, 186-87 (2004).

themselves who form these institutions for their communities. Often, these institutions start out informally, loosely referred to as civil society, based in non-formal collectives or coalitions, which only later become an "institution" for alternative security.[91] These institutions cannot be effective without an empowered community to voice out their needs and to maneuver the creation and maintenance of human security. Consequently, furthering the agenda for NTS must necessarily include processes for including the people whose security is in danger in the creations of these institutions, and must keep in mind that once the very people who need it are shut out from the security-defining processes; human security ceases to be effective.

VI. SECURITIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

It has been opined that human security can actually advance the cause of human rights because "[t]he language of human security ... can be used in contexts where the language of human rights would meet entrenched opposition."[92] To be sure, *human rights* and *human security* are similar in many ways:

(1) The ultimate focus and beneficiary of both human rights and human security is the individual human being. Both concepts place the individual in the centre of their concerns and bring it into the mainstream of international law, international relations, world politics and governance.[93]

(2) Expressing the well-being, dignity and livelihood of human beings in terms of security introduces the language of moral and values into a discourse that otherwise largely relies on interests. Human rights do the same when it makes the treatment of individuals contingent upon their inherent dignity and not their status as citizens or consumers.[94]

(3) Human rights and human security are both protective by nature.[95]

(4) Proponents of human security often employ the language of human rights not only in relation to these common concerns, but also to

91. *Id.* at 181-82.

92. Santhosh Persaud, *How Should the Human Rights Community Strategically Position Itself Towards the Concept of Human Security?*, HUM. SEC. J., April 2008, at 34 (citing Sabina Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security (A Working Paper for the Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity) 39, *available at* http://www.dfid.gov.uk/r4d/PDF/Outputs/Inequality/wp2.pdf (last accessed Sep. 16, 2012)) (emphasis omitted).

93. Gerd Oberleitner, *Porcupine in Love: The Intricate Convergence of Human Rights and Human Security*, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 588, 594 (2005).

94. *Id.* at 595.

95. *Id.*

> define the content of human security and to describe its distinctive elements and characteristics, its objectives, or the threats against which human security protects.[96]

That said, the promotion and protection of human rights are essentially about engaging the State on the basis of its legal obligations while human security is seen as political in nature,[97] thus, presenting "an inherent danger of weakening the legal force of human rights."[98] This is especially true, when one considers what securitization entails. In this wise, Santhosh Persaud writes —

> Securitization is not only about militarization, but also about the fact that everything should be done to achieve security. Hence, there is a danger to take *'security as the desired end'* which might lead to pursuing human security with extraordinary means outside the legal framework.[99]

In defining what securitization is, commentator Shofwan Al-Banna Choiruzzad described it as "a speech act by a 'securitizing actor' to elevate an issue from the realm of low politics (bounded by democratic rules and decision-making procedures) to the realm of high politics (characterized by urgency, priority[,] and a matter of life and death)."[100]

Furthermore, Kai Michael Kenkel expounded on the implications of securitization by saying —

> To security[z]e an issue is to engage in a speech act by which an issue is moved 'beyond the established rules of the game' and framed 'either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. ... What is essential is the designation of an existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures and the acceptance of that designation by a significant audience.'[101]

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96. *Id.* at 596.

97. Persaud, *supra* note 92, at 35 (citing Oberlietner, *supra* note 95, at 596).

98. Persaud, *supra* note 92, at 35.

99. Persaud, *supra* note 92, at 31 (citing Barry Buzan, *A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion That Adds Little Analytical Value*, 35 SECURITY DIALOGUE 369, 370 (2004)).

100. Shofwan Al-Banna Choiruzzad, Global War on Terror, Securitization and Human Security: Indonesia's Case, *available at* http://ritsumei.academia.edu/ShofwanAlBannaChoiruzzad/Papers/434199/Global_War_on_Terror_Securitization_and_Human_In_Security_Indonesias_Case (last accessed Sep. 6, 2012) (citing Rens van Muster, Logics of Security: The Copenhagen School, Risk Management and the War on Terror (A Political Science Publication) 3, *available at* http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Om_SDU/Institutter/Statskundskab/Skriftserie/05RVM10.pdf (last accessed Sep. 6, 2012)).

101. Kai Michael Kenkel, Human Security, Securitisation and Civil-Military Relations in Transitional Societies: the Case of Brazil (Draft Prepared for the 48th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association) 10, *available at*

After a threat or problem (*referent object*) has been labeled as "security," securitization elevates this problem as a priority in the political agenda. This prioritization "is justified by the fact that the term security refers explicitly to the presence of an existential threat to a given human collectivity on whose behalf these actors purport to speak."[102]

Because of the security status of the referent object, the "securitizing actor claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent object's survival."[103] There is therefore a very real possibility that the process of securitization "could lead to abuse of power by the securitizing actor against other actors (which labeled as 'existential threat'). Without following the normal rules, everything is justified — including measures that are threatening and eroding human security."[104]

While some areas identified as non-traditional human security (e.g., water and food security, health, migration and trafficking) can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights[105] and other major human rights instruments, these problems are framed in the rights language. Thus, the discourse on food and water security is transformed into the right to food and water; and it will create State obligations, specifically under human rights treaties. In other words, under the human rights regime, States-Parties are expected to observe the norms set out in the treaties, failure of which will amount to a human rights violation.

It is noteworthy to point out that especially with the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,[106] there is an obligation to use "the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant."[107]

Thus, the act of securitizing a threat or problem and bringing it to the level of top priority with the end in view of employing extraordinary measures to address it, can actually pose a threat to human rights in that said

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http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/Kenkel_ISA2007_Human Security.pdf (last accessed Sep. 6, 2012).

102. *Id.* at 9 (citing BARRY BUZAN, ET AL., SECURITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 21 (1998)).

103. Choiruzzad, *supra* note 100 (Rita Taureck, *Securitization Theory and Securitization Studies*, 9 J. INT. RELAT. DEV. 53, 54-55 (2006)).

104. Choiruzzad, *supra* note 100.

105. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).

106. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2 (1), *opened for signature* Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.

107. *Id.*

measures might erode human rights norms already established and recognized by a State under existing human rights treaties.

It should be borne in mind that securitization should not diminish the gains that have already achieved by virtue of a State's compliance with its treaty obligations. Thus, while securitization may help bring human rights issues in the priority list within a human security agenda, the "significant audience" must not forget that they remain as rights holders of a broader range of rights characterized as "human rights." whether these are securitized or not; and the State does not only assume the role of a "securitizing actor" or agent but more importantly, they take on the role of duty-bearer from whom citizens should claim and assert the obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill their human rights.