

Speech (Untitled)

Cesar V. Bengzon

2 ATENEO L.J. 307 (1953)

SUBJECT(S): POLITICAL LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

KEYWORD(S): JUDICIAL ORGANIZATION, SEPARATION OF POWERS, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP

In this Speech, the Author submits that the Judiciary suffers one principal handicap: the two-thirds rule to nullify legislation. Placed hand in hand with the current structure of Government allowing a great amount of intervention by the executive and legislative departments in the affairs of the Judiciary, this handicap renders the Judiciary weak and prone to succumb to the wishes and whims of these two other great branches of government.

This Speech also dwells on the possibility of a Constitutional Dictatorship — a scenario where the President, by virtue of its broad powers and influence over the Judiciary, can create a Supreme Court made up of appointees who will constantly give in to his administration's agenda. In the absence of constitutional amendments, the Author pleads to the public to exercise great care and thought in the selection of a President — that the public make sure that the person they choose to elect will responsibly handle the vast power entrusted to him, for even the Judiciary, being the “last bulwark” of democracy, may not have what it takes to keep him in check.